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JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1953, as amended), where it involves an appeal from 
a court of record in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a first degree or capital 
felony. 
STATEMENT of ISSUES 
The issue before the Court of Appeals is whether or not the trial court erred in 
denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress or Dismiss regarding use of an administrative 
check point. The questions raised pursuant to the motion to suppress or dismiss included 
deficiencies in application and implementation of the administrative check point as the 
Utah Supreme Court had previously ruled in the case of State v. Deboov, 388 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 12, (Utah 2000); the search beyond enumerated purposes of the administrative plan 
/// 
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contrary to this Court's ruling in State v Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv Rep 36 (Ut App 1998), 
and the implementation of the administrative check point to focus upon out of state 
motorists 
STANDARD of REVIEW 
Appellant believes that the central issue is one of law and interpretation of Utah law 
and the appropriate standard of review is one of "correctness " The matter was presented 
to the trial court based upon the submission of Defendant's motion to suppress and the 
State's factual statements on the matter came from officer, Jeff Chugg at the preliminary 
hearing and Officers Chugg and Squires at the hearing on Defendant's motion to 
suppress The Defendant does not believe that the material issues of fact are in dispute 
However, if in fact the matter turns on a factual disagreement, then the appropriate 
standard for review would be "clearly erroneous" In as much as a challenge to this 
judgment presents for review conclusions of law only, a review of those conclusions is for 
correctness, without according deference to the trial court's legal conclusions See 
Bonham v Morgan, 788 P 2d 497 (Utah 1989) When faced with a question of statutory 
construction, the reviewing court first looks to the plain language of the statute CIG 
Exploration, Inc , v Utah State Tax Commission, 897 P 2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995), see 
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STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions which Appellant believes applicable, are as follows: 
1. Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3 (2)(e) (1953, as amended). 
Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-104, et seq., (1953, as amended). 
PRIOR JUDICIAL AUTHORITY 
The prior judicial authority which Appellant believes applicable is from the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in State v. Deboov. 388 Utah Adv. Rep 12 (Utah 2000), and the 
Utah Court of Appeals decision in State v. Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ut 
App.1998), and it is the Appellant's contention that the trial court's ruling in the instant 
case was inconsistent with this Utah prior judicial authority. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE of the CASE: This action concerns the Appellant, ROBERT NATE ABELL, 
a Colorado adult resident who while traveling though Sevier County was stopped as part 
of an administrative check point on the 1st day of March, 2000. The application for the 
administrative check point stop was similar to the application in the case of State v. 
Deboov. before the Utah Supreme Court in that it designated multiple purposes, struck 
down as having no compelling state interest to stop and search. However, in the instant 
case, the application employed an administrative plan that went beyond the designated 
purposes of the application and was implemented in a fashion that focused upon out of 
state vehicles. The Defendant was stopped, detoured from the flow of traffic, and a full 
search of his vehicle was conducted with the use of two (2) canine units. The search 
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produced a small quantity of cocaine and marijuana The Appellant tested positive for 
marijuana and had in his possession butane lighters, charged as drug paraphernalia The 
Defendant was arrested and detained for several hours before taken to the Sevier County 
Jail for processing 
COURSE AND PROCEEDING AND DISPOSITION On or about the 18th day of 
April, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held and the Defendant was bound over, the trial 
court finding probable cause On or about the 8th day of August, 2000, a hearing was held 
on Defendant's motion to suppress or dismiss and the trial court denied the same by order 
dated the 16th day of August, 2000 On or about the 14th day of November, 2000, the 
Appellant entered into a conditional plea of guilty to all charges and was sentenced to 
serve ninety (90) days injail, and thirty-six (36) months on supervised probation, the same 
being stayed pending this appeal The Notice of Appeal was filed on the 7th day of 
December, 2000 
STATEMENT of FACTS 
1 On or about the 1st day of March, 2000, the Appellant, while traveling northbound 
on Interstate 70, through Sevier County, State of Utah, was directed by traffic control 
devices and signage indicating "construction work" ahead to an administrative check point 
stop that was set up at mile post 51, between Richfield and Salina, Utah See affidavit of 
Defendants, paragraph 2, page 73 of the Record See also the Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript at pages 5 and 6 
/// 
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2. The Appellant is an adult Colorado resident and was driving a vehicle with 
Colorado plates. When stopped he was separated from the main traffic route and his 
vehicle was searched as part of the administrative check point stop. See preliminary 
hearing transcript at pages 6 and 7. (Pages of transcripts herein referred are attached as 
Addendum D). See also affidavit of Defendant, paragraph 2-7, page 73, of the Record. 
(The affidavit of Appellant is attached as Addendum C). Small quantities of cocaine and 
marijuana were found in the search which was conducted by the use of two (2) canine 
units. Id at page 10 and 75 respectively. 
3. An application was made for an administrative check point stop along I-70 the 
previous day, February 29, 2000. See the Record at page 77; Preliminary hearing 
transcript at page 13; ( the Administrative Check Point Application is attached as 
Addendum B). The application indicated publication of the check point would be published 
in a local newspaper. Record at page 79. The application did not identify officers involved 
except to give the name and rank of the officer in charge. Id at 80. There was no 
identification of the use of canines nor was their use designated as a purpose within the 
application to search for controlled substances except that one of the application's 
designated purposes was to detect minors having in their possession alcohol or controlled 
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4 The application set forth a traffic control plan but did not identify the messages 
on the signs utilized in the plan as part the application 1 Id 
5 The application was specific as to the instructions that would be given Id at 
pages 79-80 All law enforcement officers had an operation briefing and were further 
instructed that there would be no deviation from the plan except by specific permission 
from the officer in charge Id, see also preliminary hearing transcript at page 14 
6 The most intrusive part of the process, unlike the circumstances in State v 
Debooy, was the fact that the application did not specifically enumerate searching for 
possession of controlled substances yet the implementation incorporated the routine use 
of canine units for search Nevertheless, there were several different enumerated 
purposes ranging from promoting public safety to checking for equipment violations and 
proof of insurance That would not have required such an extensive search procedure 
Id at page 78 As noted in Debooy, checking for equipment violations is already a highly 
regulated area without the need of enforcement through an administrative check point and 
therefore calls into question the compelling state interest 
7 Since illegal substances were found in the Appellant's vehicle, he was 
handcuffed and left at the scene for several hours exposed to risk of harm and the 
1
 As for the signs used and the basis of proper notice, there is no question that the signage 
was misleading and deceptive to motorists believing that the traffic control measures were for 
highway construction and not for safety See Preliminary hearing transcript at page 17 This 
smacks of entrapment However, Appellant did not raise the issue of entrapment at the trial level 
and mentions the signage on this appeal for the purpose of showing a similar patten of deception 
involved in the application and implementation of the administrative check point 
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elements. See the Record at 75 and 76. The Appellant observed while in custody other 
cars from the State of Colorado or other states stopped and searched. Cars from Utah 
were allowed to go through without being stopped. Id. 
8. On or about the 8th day of August, 2000, the Appellant moved to suppress and 
the motion was denied by the trial court, on the 16th day of August, 2000. (A copy of the 
trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum A). The trial court relying upon the State's 
contention that the application in the instant case was more limiting in allowing officers to 
inspect only the most obvious of vehicle equipment violations. See transcript on hearing 
on motion to suppress at page 17. 
9. On or about the 14th day of November, 2000, the Appellant entered into a 
conditional plea of guilty to all charges and was sentenced by the trial court, the sentence 
stayed pending this appeal. See Record at 124 to 128. 
10. On or about the 7th day of December, 2000, the Appellant filed this Appeal for 
review by the Court of Appeals of the trial court's judgment, denying Appellant's motion to 
suppress or dismiss. See Record at 132. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
A. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress or dismiss and 
in upholding an administrative check point similar to the application and circumstances 
struck down in State v. Deboov. The implementation involves the use of officers and 
procedures beyond the scope of that which is enumerated or could be reasonably inferred 
/// 
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as part of the plan for enforcement under the application and in achieving the objective 
determined by the judicial authority to be a clear and compelling State interest. 
1. The application for the Administrative Check Point was too broad to meet 
the restrictive requirements of Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-104 (1953, as amended). 
Although use of administrative check points is authorized by statute, the Utah Supreme 
Court and Court of Appeals have restricted its use and application to compelling State 
interests and only allowed if proper and adequate provision is made for judicial scrutiny 
and notice to the public. The Courts also require that the implementation of the 
administrative check point be made upon neutral criteria, which does not leave 
discretionary considerations of search and seizure to the field officer and does not 
compromise the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion. In State v. Deboov, 388 Utah 
Adv. Rep 12 (Utah 2000), the Utah Supreme Court struck down the use of administrative 
check points where the application set forth multiple enumerated purposes which did not 
demonstrate a compelling State interest. The instant case is similar to Deboov and should 
be struck down. 
2. The search in the instant case goes beyond the enumerated purposes of 
the administrative plan in a calculated but unacceptable procedure. The enumerated 
purposes in the instant case did not identify searches for controlled substances as one of 
its objectives. Likewise, the use of canine units as part of the searching procedure is not 
set forth in the application affording the judicial authority the opportunity to scrutinize such 
an intrusion upon the traveling public. 
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3. The implementation of the Administrative Check Point was conducted in 
a way that focused upon out of state vehicles and calls into question the compelling State 
interest as designated in the application. Appellant's observations while arrested and 
detained at the check point location for several hours was that only out of state vehicles 
were being searched and Utah vehicles were allowed to continue without search. The 
State will contend that was not the case but the Appellant's observations call into question 
the compelling State interest justifying the use of an administrative check point with the 
application designating multiple purposes of a safety nature when enforcement is 
exercising a search procedure utilizing canine units to search out of state vehicles. The 
Appellant contends that the circumstances show the State's use of the statutory procedure 
as a pretext to conduct searches of vehicles and avoid judicial scrutiny and the Terry 
standard of reasonable suspicion. 
4. Since the administration check point violates the standard set in Debooy, 
Appellant's motion to suppress should have been granted as the evidence served by the 
search constituted "Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" and the case should have been 
dismissed. The trial court's attempt to disqualify the application of Debooy from the factual 
circumstances in the instant case is unconvincing and focuses on the dicta portion of 
Justice Durham's decision. There can not be an independent basis for justifying the 
search in the instant case because Debooy forecloses that line of analysis. The trial 
court's order is inconsistent with the reasoning and result of both Debooy and Deherrera 
and should be overturned. 
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ARGUMENTS 
A. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS OR SUPPRESS AND IN UPHOLDING AN ADMINISTRATIVE 
CHECKPOINT SIMILAR TO THE APPLICATION AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
STRUCK DOWN IN STATE V. DEBOOY. 
The issue before the Court of Appeals is whether or not the trial court erred in 
denying Defendant's motion to suppress or dismiss regarding an administrative check 
point. The application in the instant case is similar to that considered by the Utah 
Supreme Court in State v. Debooy. Additionally, the application in the instant case was 
improper because it utilized officers and procedures not enumerated in the application and 
focused upon out of state vehicles. 
POINT NO. I 
The Application For The Administrative Check Point Was Too Broad To Meet The 
Restrictive Requirements To Utah Code Annotated § 77-23-104 (1953, as amended), 
The use of administrative check point stops in the state of Utah is statutorily 
permitted. However, the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have 
restricted its application. In State v. Debooy. 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 12 (Utah 2000), the Utah 
Supreme Court struck down the use of an administrative check point, finding the same 
violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I and Section 
14 of the Utah Constitution where an application designates multiple purposes and the 
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State's compelling interest is not clear. In pertinent part the Supreme Court stated as 
follows: 
The check point in the instance case is far more intrusive than the check 
points at issue in Martinez-Forte and Stiz. Those cases involved brief stops 
in which the officers were searching for only one purpose, .... the present 
case, the State has a clear compelling interest in promoting highway safety 
in keeping drunk drivers off the road. Drunk driving presents a great danger 
to all motorists and threaten the safety of others using the highway. A check 
point such as the one Stiz can advance the State's interest. However, the 
check point in the present case is not limited to preventing drunk driving. At 
this check point, the police conducted sweeping inspections of license 
plates, registration certificates, insurance certificates, drivers licences, seat 
belt use, compliance with child restraint laws, vehicle eguipment violations, 
and compliance with commercial vehicle regulations, in addition to checking 
for driver under the influence of alcohol or other substances, as well as other 
alcohol or controlled substances violations. 
When many legal violations are searched for, the purpose of the check point 
becomes less a highway safety measure, and more a pretext to stop all 
vehicles to search for any and all violations of the law that might be 
apparent. This generalized stop and search, of course occurred without any 
individualized suspicion of a crime having been committed much less 
probable cause. Id at pages 14 and 15 (emphasis added). 
In the case of State v. Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv. Rep. 36 (Ut App. 1998) the Utah 
Court of Appeals similarly struck down the use of an administrative check point violating 
Utah Law and the United States Constitution, finding it to be entirely too long and stating 
that it did not specifically include all the names of officers authorized to conduct search 
and the purposes and instructions given to the officers at the road went beyond the 
statutory scope, violating the criteria of Sitz. See Michigan Department of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455,110S. Ct. 2481, 2488 (1990). The balancing test in Sitz, adopted 
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by the Court of Appeals in Deherrera, emphasizes the implementation of a procedure 
based upon neutral criteria, not left to officers' discretion in the field, and not compromising 
the Terry standard for reasonable suspicion The trial court in Deherrera acknowledged 
that an administrative check point, broadened to multiple purposes, was too intrusive upon 
individual liberties, but denied Defendant's motion to dismiss upon a good faith exception 
to the exclusionary rule The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in concluding 
that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence 
obtained therefrom should have been suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree " See 
also Longsonv United States, 371 U S 471, 487-88, 83S Ct 407, 417 (1963) 
In the instant case, the application for the administrative check point is very similar 
to that found in the case of State v Debooy The trial court denied Defendant's motion to 
suppress on the basis that this application limited officers to conducting an exterior 
examination of vehicles, to make a cursory walk around the vehicles inspecting for plain 
view evidence of violation, which was less discretionary than Debooy The Appellant 
contends that the trial court's rationale relies upon dicta in the Debooy case which 
demonstrates the trial court's misunderstanding of Deboov's scope and holding Justice 
Durham, as way of example mentions equipment violations as a particularly appalling use 
of administrative check point The trial court has taken that to mean that this was the only 
area of concern for the Court The Appellant contends that the matter is 
/// 
/// 
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one balancing compelling state interests with that of protection of individual liberties and 
that the use of multiple purpose application for check points diminishes the compelling 
nature of the state's interest. 
The trial court's analysis of the matter does not attempt to address how the slight 
modification of the application of in the instant case effectively overcomes the problems 
identified by Justice Durham in preserving a clear and compelling State interest that would 
justify an intrusion upon individual liberties and ailowforthe administration of check points 
with multiple purposes. 
POINT NO. II 
The Search In The Instant Case Goes Beyond The Enumerated Purposes Of The 
Administrative Plan In a Calculated But Unacceptable Procedure. 
The application in the instant case, similar to Deboov, enumerated seven (7) 
separate purposes. These were as follows: 
A. To promote a safe public environment for all persons using the State highway. 
B. To inspect compliance with seatbelts and child restraint requirements. 
C. To determine if drivers are impaired. 
D. To protect minors having been in their possession alcohol or controlled 
substances. 
E. To conduct exterior examination of the of vehicles for the require lights, turn 
signals, and other exterior required safety devices. 
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F To conduct routine level three (3) inspections of commercial vehicles over 
twenty-six thousand and one pounds (26,001) BGW 
G Inspect the validity of license plates, registration certificates, proof of insurance 
and drivers licenses 
There was no designated purpose in the application specifying a canine aided 
search for possession of alcohol or controlled substances The use of canines could not 
reasonably be used to achieve the designated purposes in the application except for that 
for that purpose designated as B "to detect minors having in their possession alcohol or 
controlled substances " Appellant and his passenger were not minors As part of the 
instruction given in the application, officers were to "request a driver's license, state 
vehicle registration, and certificate and proof insurance" Officers [were] will be directed 
to make a cursory walk around the vehicles inspecting from plain view evidence of the 
above listed violations" (Emphasis added) Also in the application, it states that 
investigation with regard to criminal offenses, other than those enumerated, will be 
pursued only if an officer, while complying with the instruction procedures, obtains 
evidence or information constituting a reasonable suspicion of such independent criminal 
conduct (Emphasis added) See application at subsection M This procedure was not 
c 
followed in the Appellant's case 
Perhaps the most disturbing use of this particular administrative check point is the 
precalculated use of two (2) canine units No designation of the use is made in the 
application The use of a canine can not be reasonably understood as an implicit part of 
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achieving the designated purposes set forth in the application It appears that the 
administrative check point application was itself used as a pretext to search vehicles for 
possession of controlled substances or other criminal law violations without examination 
or review by a judicial authority Moreover, the application fails to identify the canine units 
as officers or to give instruction as to their use to the officers as part of the application and 
appears to go beyond that which was intended under State v Deherrera, 346 Utah Adv 
Rep 36 (Ut App 1998) In that case, the Court of Appeals stated 
At the very least, those involved in deposing the administrative check 
point plan and in seeking judicial approval must be encouraged to conform 
with their actions in both State Statue and the Constitution Moreover, we 
decry the mechanism by which the Utah County Attorney's Office sought to 
enlarge the application of the administrative traffic check point statute 
instead of presenting the judicial officer from who approval was sought with 
a new and coherent plan each time a change was sought, the County 
Attorney simply presented amendments, all contained within the same short 
document, then referred to the original administrative check point plans 
Each time the plan was presented, the County Attorney, and an officer of the 
Court, and the judge approving the plan, as a judicial officer, had an 
obligation to examine the entire plan in terms of the statutory requirements 
In addition, had the County Attorney presented the plan and its amendments 
in terms of the statute, and had the judicial officer reviewed them as part of 
the plan either as procedure or as officers utilize to implement the 
procedure Id at 38 
As the Court of Appeals stated in Deherrera, it is difficult to see how the plan would 
have been approved, and such a procedure followed The statute clearly states 
requirements that were not followed in this case, such as the requirement that officers on 
the plan's roster be listed by name Id at page 39 The fact that this entire procedure is 
not mentioned as part of the administrative plan in the instant case, seems to even go 
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farther afoul of that which concerned the Utah Court of Appeals in Deherrera. Clearly, 
the judge approving the plan as a judicial officer had no opportunity in this case to even 
consider whether the implementation of canines for vehicle search would be justified as 
a proper procedure to advance a compelling state interest. 
Notwithstanding, this use of canine units was one clearly calculated and 
contemplated and Appellant is forced to assume was done so purposefully and deceitfully 
to omit from the application those procedures that law enforcement thought would be 
questionable to avoid judicial scrutiny. 
POINT NO. Ill 
The Implementation of the Administrative Check Point Stop was Conducted in a way 
That Focused Upon out of State Vehicles and Therefore Calls into Question the 
Compelling State Interest in the Designated Purposes of the Application. 
While Appellant was detained at the administrative check point and before being 
processed at the Sevier County Jail, he had adequate opportunity to observe the 
implementation of the administrative check point stop by law enforcement. His 
observations suggest that the focus was not consistent with the criteria set forth in the 
balancing test of Sitz, mentioned above or designated as purposes with the application, 
but in fact focused upon out of state motorists. His observations suggest that the only 
vehicles that were detained or removed from the flow of traffic were vehicles of other 
states. This implementation calls into question the designated purposes enumerated in 
the application and their compelling state interest. Even if the Court were to assume that 
the designated purposes constituted a valid stop, it seems that if the State had any 
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compelling interest in the designated purposes, that the focus would be upon Utah 
vehicles and not out of state vehicles as was implemented at the traffic control stop. 
Again, through the implementation there is a strong indication of a plan focused upon 
stopping all vehicles to search for any and all violations of the law, particularly the 
possession of controlled substances, through the use of a generalized stop and search 
which did not meet the criteria of the Terry test involving reasonable suspicion. 
POINT NO. IV 
Since The Administrative Check Point Stop Violates The Standard Set In State v. 
Deboov, Appellant's Motion To Suppress Should Have Been Granted as the Evidence 
Constituted "Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree" and the Case should have been Dismissed. 
The Appellant argues that circumstances in the instant case are so similar to those 
addressed in State v. Deboov, that the trial court's attempted to distinguish the same on 
a slight change in the language of one of the enumerated purposes in the application is 
insufficient to disqualify the application of Deboov to the present circumstances. The 
Appellant further asserts that the trial court was in error in attempting to do so and further 
asserts that the facts and circumstances of the instant case do not lend themselves to any 
limitation of the Deboov standard. As in Deboov, even if the trial court attempted to 
establish an independent justification for stop, excluding the administrative check point, 
the Utah Supreme Court made clear that such analysis could not prevail. The check point 
is what affords law enforcement the opportunity to observe law violations directly or 
reported. Consequently, if the administrative check point fails to meet the statutory criteria 
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as applied by the Utah Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the evidence obtained 
from the use of such an improper administrative check point must be suppressed as "fruit 
of the poisonous tree" and the case dismissed. The Appellant asserts that the trial court 
was in error in failing to follow the prior rulings of the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Supreme Court regarding this subject, and therefore the trial court's decision should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
On the grounds and for the reasons set forth above Appellant requests that the 
Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's judgment and order and dismiss or in the 
alternative to remand with instruction to the trial court to rule consistently with Utah law 
under the circumstances together with such other and further relief as to this Court 
appears equitable and proper. 
DATED this day of , 20 . 
J. BRYAN JACKSON 
Attorney for Appellant Abel I 
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I hereby certify that on the day of , 20 , I did mailed 
a true and correct photocopy of the BRIEF OF APPELLANT ABELL, by way of U S mail, 
postage fully prepaid, thereon, to the following 
R DON BROWN 
SEVIER COUNTY ATTORNEY 
835 East 300 North 
Richfield, Utah 84701 
MARKL SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
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Post Office Box 140230 
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ADDENDUM A 
COPY OF COURT RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
DISTRICT COURT, SEVIER COUNTY, UTAH 
895 East 300 North 
Richfield, UT 84701 
Telephone: (435) 896-2700 Fax: (435) 896-8047 
1 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ROBERT NATE ABELL, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
.Case No. 001600077 
Assigned Judge K. L. McIFF 
Officers of the Utah Highway Patrol obtained court approval for an administrative traffic 
checkpoint on Interstate Highway 70 located in Sevier County. The purposes of the checkpoint 
were set forth as follows: 
A. To promote a safe public environment for all persons using the state highways. 
B. To inspect compliance with seat belt and child restraint requirements. 
C. To determine if drivers are impaired. 
D. To detect minors having in their possession alcohol or controlled substances. 
E. To conduct exterior examination of vehicles for the required lights, turn signals, 
and other exterior required safety devices. 
F. To conduct routine level three inspections of commercial vehicles over 26,001 
pounds GVW. 
G. To inspect the validity of license plates, registration certificates, proof of insurance 
and driver licenses. 
The officers participating in the operation received, among others, the following 
instruction: 
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This administrative checkpoint is a driver license and registration check and is to detect 
and apprehend individuals suspected of violating the following regularly enforced state 
laws driver license violations, registration violations, proof of insurance violations, 
equipment violations, drivers license, state vehicle registration certificate and valid proof 
of insurance Officers will be directed to make a cursory walk around the vehicle 
inspecting for plain view evidence of the above listed violations 
Other relevant facts will be set forth as part of the legal analysis 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The principle thrust of the defendant's argument is that the application and authorization 
for the administrative traffic checkpoint is overly broad in light of the recent Utah Supreme Court 
decision in State v Debooy, 388 Utah Adv Rep 12 (Feb 2000) The analysis is not complex In 
Debooy, the officers were authorized to "inspect and/or detect vehicle equipment violations" 
There were no further limitations or instructions The Debooy court considered this authorization 
to be too "sweeping" and its meaning unclear There were no guidelines as to how the officers 
were to conduct their inquiry and the extent thereof was left entirely to their discretion The court 
reasoned that some "officers might choose to check only the headlights, while others might be 
subjected to a full 'diagnostic' exam " 
The State claims that the application and authorization in the present case took into 
consideration the holding in Debooy and is sufficiently limited in scope to be valid The 
limitations appear to be these The officers were directed "to conduct exterior examination of 
vehicles" and "to make a cursory walk around the vehicle inspecting for plain view evidence" 
of the violations, which were listed in the application 
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It appears that the State might be probing the outer limit with the application and 
authorization employed in this case On balance, this Court has determined that they are not so 
"general" and so "unlimited" as to violate either the Utah or federal constitution The application 
and authorization are here upheld principally for the reason that the type of encroachment 
approved can be conducted in a minimal amount of time and with a minimum amount of invasion. 
Unless something is in "plain view"1 the examination for equipment violations is at an end The 
officers discretion is not unbridled and the acceptable procedure not without guidance 
The defendant also objects to the use of two canines who detected the presence of 
controlled substances This however did not occur until Officer Chugg, who had previously made 
some 1500 drug arrests and smelled burnt marijuana on hundreds of occasions, detected the odor 
of burnt marijuana in the vehicle This further detention and investigation and use of resources 
was contemplated by paragraph M of the Application and Authorization which provided as 
follows 
Investigations with regard to criminal offenses, other than those above enumerated, will be 
pursued only if an officer, while complying with the instructed procedure, obtains evidence 
or information constituting a reasonable suspicion of such independent criminal conduct 
Defendant next argues that the officers were stopping only vehicles with Colorado license 
plates The State's evidence was to the contrary and the arresting officer gave undisputed 
testimony that he took formal action against persons in seven different vehicles two were from 
Both counsel agree that "plain view" includes anything detectable by any of the physical senses 
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Utah, one was from Illinois, one from Kansas and three from Colorado. The Court concludes that 
there was no selective enforcement involving only vehicles from a particular state. 
Finally, defendant complains that while stopped a trucker, who was also stopped, accused 
defendant of speeding or reckless driving. This occurred after the presence of controlled 
substances was detected and was simply a non-factor. The situation is different than present in 
Debooy where the illegal checkpoint produced the only evidence. 
ORDER 
For the reasons aforesaid, the defendant's motion to suppress is denied. 
Dated this ( ( Q day of August, 2000. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On August , 2000 a copy of the above was sent to each of the following by the 
method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) 
R. Don Brown [p] J. Bryan Jackson [m] 
Sevier County Attorney Attorney at Law 
835 East 300 North, Suite 100 157 East Center Street 
Richfield, UT 84701 P.O. Box 519 
Cedar City, UT 84721-0519 
ADDENDUM B 
COPY OF ADMINISTRATIVE CHECK POINT 
APPLICATION 
IN THE JUSTICE COURT OF SEVIER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the matter of: APPLICATION AND AUTHORIZATION 
Administrative Traffic FOR ADMINISTRATION TRAFFIC 
Checkpoint No. CHECKPOINT 
Judge Kent Nielsen 
Case No. 
APPLICATION 
Pursuant to the Provision of Section 77-23-104, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, I, 
lieutenant Keith D. Squires, of the Utah Highway Patrol, State of Utah, hereby respectfully make 
ipplication for authorization to conduct an administrative traffic checkpoint based upon the following plan: 
I. Location: Interstate 70, milepost 51 
(The milepost listed is an approximation and closest to the location area.) 
Geograpliical and topographical information is as follows: Interstate 70 at milepost 51 is a level, 
two-lane with wide emergency lanes, east- and westbound freeway. Traffic control will be 
coordinated through and approved by the local UDOT Safety Engineer. A large median crossover 
will be the staging area, it is visible from Vi mile in either direction. The area has plenty of room to 
move traffic in a safe fashion and there are no obstructions (trees, etc.). The median is planted in 
short grass with no obstructions for east- or westbound traffic. The roadway is above the valley 
floor. A diagram of the site including traffic contiol specifications is attached. 
II. Dates/Times: March 1, 2000, 0700-1900 hours; and March 29, 2000, 0700-1900 hours. 
DDL Sequence of traffic to be stopped: 
All automobiles, station wagons, vans, pickup trucks, recieational veliicles, and commercial vehicles 
will be stopped. In the event that stopped traffic exceeds ten vehicles, all traffic will be waved through 
the checkpoint until only six vehicles are waiting. Commercial vehicles over 26,001 pounds may be 
checked by U.T.I.P. and field personnel. A level three inspection will be conducted on all commercial 
vehicles over 26,001 pounds GVW. The inspection and inquiry procedures are estimated to require 
approximately 30 seconds duration except on commercial vehicles over 26,001 pound GVW, which 
generally take 1 Vi minutes. 
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Purpose: 
A. To promote a safe public environment for all persons using the state liighways. 
B. To inspect compliance with seat belt and child restraint requirements. 
C. To determine if drivers are impaired. 
D. To detect minors having in their possession alcohol orcontrolled substances. 
E. To conduct exterior examination of veliicles for the required lights, turn signals, and other exterior 
required safety devices. 
F. To conduct routine level tliree inspections of commercial veliicles over 26,001 pounds GVW. 
G. To inspect the validity of license plates, legislation certificates, proof of msurancc and diivcr 
licenses. 
V. Rank of Officcr(s) in Charge: Equipment: 
A. Agencies Involved: 
Utah Highway Patrol - Utah Department of Public Safety 
Sevier County Sheriffs Office 
(All individual officers participating will be listed on the after action report.) 
Rank of Officer In Charge: 
Command level officer - Lieutenant. Keith D. Squires; Supervisor - Sergeant. Lance Bushnell. 
Minimum number of officers involved: Six. 
B. Equipment: 
1. Signs, Cones and Barrels 
2. Police vehicles and emergency lights 
3. UHP Breath Alcohol Testing Mobile Unit 
4. 48,f x 48" diamond-shaped, orange warning signs will be placed 1500, 1000, and 500 feet 
prior to the checkpoint. Marked patrol veliicles will be positioned at the checkpoint and 
orange reflective cones and barrels will be used to direct the traffic flow. Uniformed 
officers will be present to direct traffic. 
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VI. Advance Notice: 
An article announcing these administrative checkpoints has been published in the Riclifield Reaper 
Newspaper on January 26, 2000. 
VTL Instructions: 
A. All enforcement officers will be given a copy of this plan at an operational briefing to be held 
before the checkpoint. Command and supervisory level UIIP personnel will specifically outline 
the purpose and procedures to be followed by all participating officers. 
D. Any deviation from the plan will require specific permission from the officer in charge. Any 
deviation must be documented by him as to the reason for, nature of, and effect of any 
deviation. 
C. The checkpoint site will be set up approximately one hour in advance. 
D. If a violation is encountered, the vehicle will be detained at the side of the checkpoint in a safe 
area as shown on the diagram for a reasonable amount of time in order to take appropriate 
enforcement action. 
E. In the event that all personnel are involved in enforcement or traffic becomes unduly delayed, 
the checkpoint will be discontinued to alleviate the traffic delay. When all contacts have been 
processed and/or traffic flow returns to normal, the checkpoint will again be operational and 
resume the outlined procedures. 
F. An after action report will be prepared by the officer in charge of the checkpoint, reviewed by 
the command level supervisor and p ressed to the issuing magistrate. 
G. The officer in charge of the checkpoint shall be available to exhibit a copy of this plan and 
signed authorization to any motorist who has been stopped at the checkpoint, upon request of 
the motorist. 
H. This administrative checkpoint is a diiver license and registration check and is to detect and 
apprehend individuals suspected of violating the following regulaily enforced state laws: driver 
license violations; registration violations; proof of insurance violations; equipment violations; 
safety inspection violations; alcohol and DUI violations. Officers will be instructed to request a 
drivers license, state vehicle registration certificate and valid proof of insurance. Officers will 
be directed to make a cursory walk around the vehicle inspecting for plain view evidence of the 
above listed violations. 
I. Procedure: Officers will set up previously described traffic control prior to briefing. All officers 
involved will meet at 0730 hours at the administrative checkpoint location where they will be 
briefed as to purpose of the checkpoint, uniform observation and stopping procedures, specific 
information to request, safety concerns, types of violations to be observed, roadblock 
assignments, and reasonable detainment of motorists. Citizens will not be delayed longer than is 
reasonable to check driver licenses, registrations, proof of insurance certificates and to observe 
for detectable violations visible from the outside of the vehicle. Appiopriate enforcement will be 
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taken on any observed violation and motorists will be detained only so long as necessary to 
complete the appropriate enforcement. Commercial vehicles over 26,001 pounds GVW may be 
detained long enough to conduct level three inspections. 
Safety consciousness for officers and motorists will be maintained throughout the entire 
roadblock, and potential unsafe situations will be reported immediately to the officer in charge 
of the checkpoint. 
Overall on-scene supervision of the roadblock is under the direction of the officer in charge. 
That responsibility will fall upon the UIIP Section 10 Lieutenant when he is on scene and by the 
supervising UHP Sergeant when the Lieutenant is not present. 
Each enforcement officer involved will keep a record of his/her enforcement and provide this 
information to the officer in charge at the completion of his shift.. The information required is: 
1. Type of violation 
2. Type of enforcement 
3. Number 
4. Total 
Investigations with regard to criminal offenses, other than those above enumerated, will be 
pursued only if an officer, while complying with the instructed procedure, obtains evidence or 
information constituting a reasonable suspicion of such independent criminal conduct. 
23 
Dated this — — day of February, 2000 
^tU46<& 
Lieutenant Keith D. Squires 
UHP Section 10 Commander 
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ADDENDUM C 
COPY OF APPELLANT'S AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, P.C. 
J. BRYAN JACKSON, USB #4488 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
157 East Center Street 
Post Office Box 519 
Cedar City, Utah 84721-0519 
(435) 586-8450 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs ) 
ROBERT NATE ABELL, ) 
Defendant ) 
J 
STATE of ) 
)ss 
COUNTY of ) 
We, GARY ANTHONY CALABRO and ROBERT NATE ABELL. do each of us 
individually and together make this Affidavit of our own personal knowledge and of our own 
free will do depose and state as follows: 
/// 
/// 
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANTS 
IN SUPPORT OF THEIR MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 001600077 FS 
Judge: David L Mower 
1. That each of us is a resident of the State of Colorado and that we make this 
affidavit based upon our personal information which we observed first hand and that we 
make this affidavit voluntarily and of our own free will. 
2. On or about the 151 day of March. 2000, we were traveling north bound on 
Interstate 70 toward Colorado through the State of Utah when we can upon an area which 
appeared to be traffic control and which the posted signage indicated was for the purpose 
of construction work ahead. 
3. That the traffic control devises consisted of signs, cones and other lane directing 
devices which brought all traffic into a single lane. 
4. That we were required to stop behind several vehicles including one (1) semi-
truck While waiting in line with the other vehicles, the Defendant, ROBERT NATE ABELL, 
did undo his seatbelt and rolled the window down. 
5. Thereafter, our vehicle was approached by an officer who identified himself as 
officer Chugg and requested that we provide him with proof of I D , registration and 
insurance. 
6. That the Defendant Mr ABELL, informed the officer that the car was a rental car 
and Mr ABELL handed the officer the copy of the rental agreement which had been kept 
in the jockey box. 
7. That without further discussion, the officer told us that we were to pull over into 
a separate lane, "'staging area'. 
/// 
/// 
Page 2 of 6 
PAGE 09 
8. That Mr. ABELL asked the officer why they were being asked to pull out of the 
main lane of traffic and into a different area and the officer simply informed Mr. ABELL and 
myself that it was to "straighten tilings out \ 
9. That once we pulled over into the staging area, the officer requested permission 
to search the vehicle The Defendant, ROBERT NATE ABELL. the driver and responsible 
party for the vehicle, refused permission for a search and requested that the officer inform 
him as to what was going on. 
10. The staging area was within a clear and unobstructed view of the main lane of 
traffic for at least a half a mile in either direction. 
11. The officer informed Mr, ABELL that he believed that Mr. ABELL was driving 
under the influence The officer requested that Mr. ABELL perfor m field sobriety tests Mr. 
ABELL agreed to perform such tests. 
12. Mr. ABELL performed all of the field tests as he was instructed 
13. The Defendant, GARY ANTHONY CALABRO, was able to observe the tests 
and particularly Mr. CALABRO was able to over hear the instruction that was given to the 
Defendant, ROBERT NATE ABELL and observe him performing the tests and Mr 
CALABRO states that Mr, ABELL performed the test just as he was instructed, particularly, 
Mr CALABRO notes that while the officer informed Mr ABELL to touch his nose with the 
tip of his finger, by demonstrating the instruction the officer in fact touched his nose with 
the pad of his finger which Mr. ABELL duplicated in his performance of the test In 
addition, Mr CALABRO while watching closely how Mr ABELL performed the test and was 
/// 
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not able to distinguish any particular time when Mr ABELL was slow or delayed in putting 
his hand to his sidet but on each occasion it appeared to be as the officer had directed. 
14. Mr. CALABRO also notes that he observed Mr. ABELL perform the test 
estimating when 30 seconds had passed and Mr CALABRO believes that Mr. ABELL was 
able to do so within only a few seconds of estimating the actual 30 seconds. Mr. 
CALABRO further noted that Mr ABELL was alert, he was able to maintain his own 
balance without assistance, he was able to follow the instructions that were given to him 
to the letter and he was able to operate the motor vehicle that day from Las Vegas, 
Nevada to the check point stop. 
15 That at the time of the Preliminary Hearing we were informed that the rental 
agreement allegedly had the odor of marijuana on it We have retained the rental 
agreement and it has no such odor as far as we are able to detect, and never had such 
odor, 
16, That the vehicle was searched and we were detained for approximately four (4) 
hours at the staging area where we were able to observe the traffic as it went through the 
traffic control stop We observed that there were many cars that were allowed to proceed 
which had Utah plates even though many of the occupants did not have seatbelts on as 
far as we could see. We did also notice that nearly all of the cars with Colorado plates 
were asked to pull into the staging area and were searched. We further observed that 
most of the people that were taken to the Sevier County Correctional Facility were in fact 
people from Colorado. 
/// 
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17. We observed that our vehicle was searched by two (2) dogs and that while the 
Defendant, GARY CALABRO, consented to allow his luggage to be searched, the officers 
had already started searching with the dogs prior to receiving such consent. We also 
observed that the vehicles were being searched before the Defendant, ROBERT NATE 
i 
ABELL, had completed the performance of the three (3) field sobriety tests which were 
being conducted. 
18. After being at the scene for four (4) hours, it was our impression that cars from 
the State of Utah were allowed to go through the administrative check point stop without 
detainment unless there were major problem that were readily visible regarding their 
vehicle or if it appeared that the driver of the vehicle was obviously under the influence of 
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the State of Colorado, with very few exceptions, were required to pull over into the staging 
area and those vehicles were searched for what appeared to be no reason. 
FURTHER AS AFFIANT WE SAYETH NAUGHT 
DATED this M day of 7^ ^ 1 20 __ 6 ° 
ROBERT 
Defendant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO ME th is^ / day of J ^ 
2 0 ( ^ 
My Commission Expires 
My <~ .. ...sjon Expires ~ 7 Ql 
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COPY OF VARIOUS PORTIONS OF TRANSCRIPTS 
FOR PRELIMINARY MOTION 
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1 taking place on that date. 
2 A. I'd been asked as a K-9 officer-to assist with an 
3 administrative checkpoint that was to take place on 1-70 at 
4 mile marker 51. 
5 THE COURT: Where is 51? 
6 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, I'd estimate it about four 
7 miles west of Salina. 
8 THE COURT: Southwest on the interstate? 
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, on the interstate. 
10 THE COURT: Thank you. 
11 Q. BY MR. BROWN: And you did take — you did participate 
12 in that activity; did you not? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. And in conjunction with that activity did you have 
15 occasion to interact with the two defendants? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Could you explain to the Court what was occurring when 
18 you first observed the two defendants. 
19 A. Yes, I was assisting with the eastbound traffic at 
20 that time. There were currently no vehicles when their vehicle 
21 approached. I observed them approaching, neither subject was 
22 wearing a seatbelt, and the windows rolled down, and I motioned 
23 for them to stop next to where I was standing. 
24 Q. And did they do so7 
25 A. Yes. 
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1 I Q. What next happened? 
2 A. I asked the driver for his — I asked both subjects 
3 for I.D. I explained the reason for that was because they 
4 weren't wearing seatbelts. The driver himself told me that 
5 they had been wearing them until they came around the corner 
6 about a half mile back. I also asked for registration and 
7 insurance, at which time they told me it was a rental car and 
8 I was given a rental agreement. 
9 Q. Okay, and upon observing that rental agreement was 
10 there anything about it that caused you concern? 
11 A. I observed that the rental agreement showed that the 
12 vehicle was overdue. It also showed that it had listed some — 
13 the areas where they were allowed to have the vehicle, and Utah 
14 was not one of them. 
15 Q. What else did you observe that caused you concern? 
16 A. While I was talking to the occupants, I believed that 
17 I could smell the odor of burnt marijuana in the vehicle, and 
18 on the rental agreement that I had. I also noticed that the 
19 driver appeared to be very nervous. He had a quiver in his 
20 voice. Also, he was only wearing a small vinyl or leather 
21 vest, despite how cold it was and his windows being down. 
22 Q. Which one was the driver? 
23 A. Excuse me. The driver was Mr. Abell. 
24 Q. Which one was that? 
25 A. The taller subject, seated far to the right of me. 
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1 Q. All right. Thank you. T'hen what happehed? 
2 A. I asked them to pull over into the lane that we had 
3 designated for the vehicles to be in while they waited for 
4 citations or other checks to be performed. 
5 Q. And did they do so? 
6 A. They did. 
7 Q. Then what happened? 
8 A. When I asked the driver to pull over there, he seemed 
9 to become even more nervous and said, "Why am I moving over to 
10 this lane?" At which time I explained that it was to allow the 
11 other traffic to go by while I took care of the situation. 
12 Q. Okay, and then what happened? 
13 A. I also saw that there was a boot knife sticking in the 
14 — below the radio in the console there. 
15 Q. Were you also advised of a citizen complaint? 
16 A. Yes. When I returned to my car to issue citations 
17 for the seatbelt offenses that I observed, one of the other 
18 troopers approached me and told me that a semi driver who had 
19 been stopped behind the vehicle in the roadblock had mentioned 
20 that these two — or that the vehicle was being driven in a 
21 reckless manner and that he wanted to sign a complaint against 
22 them. He was at that time given a statement to write up from 
23 the trooper. 
24 Q. Okay, and in fact later on you were provided with the 
25 statement from the driver? 
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1 A. Excuse me? 
2 Q. You did inspect the vehicle; you did search the 
3 vehicle? 
4 A. At that time he told us where the marijuana was and 
5 what it was in. What we decided to do was remove the baggage 
I I 
6 that was in the front of the vehicle, and we put the dogs on 
7 those specifically. 
8 There was a camera case, a couple of bags. There was 
9 a hard side — what I call makeup-type suitcase, and both dogs 
10 indicated the odor of narcotics on both the camera case where 
11 he said the marijuana was, and on the hard side case. 
12 Q. And were those items inspected? 
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. What did you find? 
15 A. I found in the camera case was the container with 
16 marijuana that the driver had described, and in the hard side 
17 case we found a bindle of a white powdery substance, which when 
18 we later tested with a NIC kit tested positive for cocaine. 
19 Q. Okay, and then what happened? 
20 A. Then at one time the other dog had indicated also on 
21 the center console of the car, and the driver had said to him 
22 — when he was told that the dog had indicated there, he said 
23 that that's where his pipe was. but he couldn't remember where 
24 it was, and at one point he asked the passenger, Mr. Calabro, 
25 asked him if he remembered where he had put his pipe. To which 
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1 training in terms of substance detection? 
2 A. I'd say in the neighborhood of 200 hours. 
3 Q. So 200 hours in the course of six years? 
4 A. Over six years. 
5 Q. How much training have you had in the last year? 
6 A. In the last year? Oh, I would say if I count the K-9 
7 training that I do with controlled substances, that it would be 
8 nearly 40 to 50. 
9 Q. And has that been primarily in the state of Utah or in 
10 any other state? 
11 A. The one class I mentioned was in Arizona. 
12 Q. I see. In Phoenix or — 
13 A. It was in Page. 
14 Q. Page, Arizona. Okay, and the other hours that you 
15 have attended, has that been through the Utah Highway Patrol 
16 or has it been through some other agency? 
17 A. Most of that would be the highway patrol. 
18 Q. I see. Were you the supervising officer on the stop? 
19 A. I was the contact officer, yes. 
20 Q. You were the contact officer, and this was basically a 
21 checkpoint stop; is that correct? 
22 A, Yes, it was. 
23 Q. An application had been filed with Judge Nelson and 
24 had been approved? 
25 I A. I believe that was the Judge's name, yes. 
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1 Q. And there were certain procedures that were to be 
2 followed pursuant to that? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. You were aware of those procedures at that time? 
5 A. I was at the briefing where they were explained. 
6 Q. Now, was that briefed at the time of the checkpoint 
7 stop or was that — was there a separate briefing? 
8 A. There was a briefing first thing in the morning, about 
9 07:30 hours. 
10 Q. At your office? 
11 A. At the scene, at the checkpoint. 
12 Q. Okay. Now, designated in the application it indicates 
13 that there were to be six officers on the scene at the time; is 
14 that correct? Is that what you understood? Minimum number of 
15 officers involved would be six? 
16 A. Okay, a minimum number, yeah. I was going to say, 
17 there was a lot more than six. 
18 Q. Were there? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. At the time that these stops were made — 
21 THE COURT: How many? 
22 THE WITNESS: How many do I guess there was? 
23 THE COURT: Yes. 




































I see. On the diagram doe's it show the signing that 
be used? 
Yes, it does. 
Signs, cones and barrels, and where they were to be 
• 
Yes. 
In looking at that diagram — I haven't seen it yet, 
looking at that diagram, does it fairly depict the way 
the checkpoint was conducted in the field or along Interstate 










It looks accurate to how it was when I was there. 
Okay. Did you use diamond shaped — four-foot diamond 
signs? 
Did I? 
Do you remember if those were used? 
They were there, yes. 
What was said on them? 
"Road Work Ahead," was on the first one, I believe. 
Lane Closed Ahead" was the next group, and I think there 
was a sign that showed that you had — the lanes merged. 
Q. So there wasn't a sign that indicated that there was 




That's what it seems like to me, yes. 
Was there any notification in the signing along this 
1 of the vehicle, and anything else that they could observe in 
2 plain view from the outside of the vehicle. 
3 Q. Now why would you do that, particularly in light of 
4 the language in DeBooy regarding equipment violations? 
5 A. Well the reason that I would do that is just to be 
6 more specific and limit the, ah, the discretion of the 
7 officers, as far as how they, ah, conduct themselves and what 
8 they ask for. 
9 Q. Do you recall the language under DeBooy where Judge 
10 Durham was particularly offended by the fact that the previous 
11 DeBooy application had included inspection of vehicle 
12 violations? 
13 A. Do you recall reading that in DeBooy? 
14 MR. BROWN: Well, Your Honor, I think that the 
15 DeBooy decision speaks for itself. The officer has made 
16 changes based on—on DeBooy. Ah, now counsel wants an 
17 interpretation of DeBooy. I suppose that's up for--I suppose 
18 that's for you to decide. But we can argue all night long 
19 about whether DeBooy, ah—well we can't. We can't argue all 
20 night long as to whether it prohibits vehicle safety problems. 
21 MR. JACKSON: I'll restate the question, Your Honor. 
22 MR. BROWN: But it certainly doesn't restrict it. 
23 THE COURT: All right. All right. Restate the 
24 question. 
25 MR. JACKSON: Can I approach, Your Honor? 
